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In the study of the evolution of cooperation, resource limitations are usually assumed just to
provide a finite population size. Recently, however, agent-based models have pointed out that
resource limitation may modify the original structure of the interactions and allow for the survival of
unconditional cooperators in well-mixed populations. Here we present analytical simplified versions
of two types of agent-based models recently published: one in which the limiting resource constraints
the ability of reproduction of individuals but not its survival, and a second one where the limiting
resource is necessary for both reproduction and survival. One finds that the analytical models
display, with a few differences, the same qualitative behavior of the more complex agent-based
models. In addition, the analytical models allow to expand the study and identify the dimensionless
parameters governing the final fate of the system, such as coexistence of cooperators and defectors,
or dominance of defectors or of cooperators. We provide a detailed analysis of the occurring phase
transitions as these parameters are varied.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r,89.65.-s,89.75.Fb,87.10.-e
Cooperation is common in nature and it is considered
to have played a key role in the evolutionary appearance
of higher selective units, such as eukaryotic cells or mul-
ticellular life, from simpler components [1]. However, its
abundance is intriguing because cooperators are vulner-
able to exploitation by defectors [2–4]. Several mecha-
nisms have been found allowing cooperative behaviors to
survive such as network structure, group selection, direct
and indirect reciprocity or tag-based donation [5, 6]. Be-
havioral mechanisms –such as the latter three examples–
require players to have some ability to avoid the exploita-
tion from defectors, such as memory or the capacity to
recognise the co-player [5, 6]. As a consequence, sim-
ple agents without these abilities, such as unconditional
cooperators, are not expected to survive in well-mixed
populations.
Aside from a few examples [7–10], the role played by
the limitation of resources in most studies on the origin
and persistence of cooperation has been just to impose a
constant population size [5, 6, 11–16]. Recently, however,
we have introduced a new viewpoint where the environ-
ment is considered explicitly by introducing a resource
flux into the system that drives it away from equilibrium
[17, 18]. This standpoint leads to unexpected outcomes,
such as that resource limitation allows for stable coexis-
tence between unconditional cooperators and defectors,
and even dominance of cooperation, in well-mixed pop-
ulations playing an a priori Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game, where defectors are expected to drive cooperators
to extinction [12]. This happens due to a selforganizing
process involving the environment which generates dy-
namical payoffs transforming the original PD structure
into a different game.
Two main scenarios can be devised for the limiting re-
source: (a) the latter is necessary for reproduction but
not for survival (such as for instance, any substance re-
quired for the development of the embryo) as analyzed
in [17] or (b) it is necessary for both reproduction and
survival (such as sugars and some other nutrients), as an-
alyzed in [18]. In both cases, agent-based models showed
that coooperation could survive for some parameter val-
ues. The purpose of this paper is to develope simplified
analytical models capturing the mechanisms involved in
the agent-based models. This will supply a more com-
plete view of the model behavior and will provide the
dimensionless groups ruling the dynamics. We show that
the analytical models yield a similar qualitative behav-
ior of the agent-based models, though with a few differ-
ences. The paper is organized as follows. In section I, we
analize the case where the limiting resource constrains
reproduction but not survival. We present the model,
its corresponding equations and analize with detail their
solutions and phase transitions. Section II performes a
similar analysis for the case where the limiting resource
constrains both reproduction and survival. Section III is
devoted to conclusions.
LIMITING RESOURCE CONSTRAINING
REPRODUCTION
Simplified analytical model
We develop here an analytical model aimimg to mimic
the model of ref. [17]. For the paper to be selfcontained,
we provide a summary of the latter model. It consists
of an evolving well-mixed population of self-replicating
individuals that receive resources from the environment
and exchange resources during interactions. No mem-
ory, learning abilities or any other sensory inputs are as-
2sumed. Each individual i is represented by its internal
amount of resources Ei and its strategy, namely cooper-
ate (C) or defect (D). The internal amount of resources
may be interpreted as the amount that belongs to it, in-
dependently of why or how. The environment provides
resources in portions E0 per unit time to randomly cho-
sen individuals independently of their strategy, thus not
modifying the structure of the payoffs; the total resource
influx ET is assumed to be constant, so that E0 = ET /N ,
with N the population number. If the amount of re-
sources of an individual exceeds a value Es, it splits into
two identical copies with half its internal amount of re-
sources. Deaths occur with probability f per unit time.
Defectors are characterized by the maximum amount of
resources associated to an interaction: the cost spent
(Ec) for stealing a reward (Er) from the co-player. If
the internal resources of a defector are smaller than the
cost Ec, it does not pay the cost nor receives the reward.
If the interaction partner has resources below the reward,
the entire amount of resources is sequestered. Thus, the
quantities associated to the defector strategy represent
the ideal outcome of the interactions. We assume that
these quantities are inherited without mutation. Large
populations with Er > Ec > 0 were considered, so that
the system plays a priori a PD game [17].
In the simplified model, the internal amount of re-
sources Ei is either 0 or 1. Each defector attacks at a
rate α per unit time to individuals chosen at random
and steals its internal resources. To do so, the defector
must have internal resources greater than 0 (i.e. Ei = 1),
otherwise it does not attack. In every interaction, the de-
fector loses its unit of resources with probability q, which
can thus be seen as the average cost paid by a defector
in an interaction. If the interaction partner has no re-
sources, no reward is obtained. Cooperators do nothing,
they just eventually suffer from defector’s attacks. Let us
note that, in an ideal situation where all individuals pos-
sess resources (Ei = 1), the payoffs for cooperators and
defectors in an interaction between them are respectively
fCD = −1, fDC = 1−q; interactions between cooperators
result in a payoff fCC = 0 for each and between defec-
tors in fDD = −q. The payoff ordering in this situation
fDC > fCC > fDD > fCD corresponds to a Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and hence the names cooperators and defec-
tors, and the expectation of the extinction of coopera-
tion. However, since not all cooperators have resources
Ei = 1, the average net reward got by defectors will be,
in general, smaller than 1 − q. This reward depends on
the fraction of cooperators in state Ei = 1, which is a dy-
namical quantity. As a consequence, the dynamics might
lead the average reward to values smaller or equal to the
cost and allow for the survival of cooperators, as we will
see below.
The system receives from the environment ET units
of resources per unit time, which are distributed equally
among the N individuals of the population independently
of its strategy, thus not modifying the interaction payoff
structure. When an individual with internal resources
Ei = 1 receives an extra unit of resources it splits into
two identical copies, each one with Ei = 1. Along with
reproduction, we assume that players die with a prob-
ability f per unit time, independently of its strategy.
Therefore, resource allocation, reproduction and death
rules are equal for both cooperators and defectors, being
the strategy the only difference.
At the sight of the two models, the main differences
between them are that in the simplified model the re-
source distribution is discrete (while it is continuous in
the agent-based model), and defectors cost is stochastic.
We consider simultaneous interactions and large pop-
ulations so that we can make a continuum approach. We
denote by c0 and c1 the number of cooperators with
internal resources 0 and 1, d1 and d0 the number of
defectors with internal resources 1 and 0, respectively;
N = c0 + c1 + d1 + d0 is then the total population size.
The evolution equations according to the mechanisms in-
volved are
dc0
dt
= αd1
c1
N
− ET
N
c0 − fc0 (1)
dc1
dt
= −αd1
c1
N
+
ET
N
(c0 + c1)− fc1 (2)
dd1
dt
= α(1− q)d1
c1
N
− αqd1(
c0 + d0 + d1
N
) +
+
ET
N
(d0 + d1)− fd1 (3)
dd0
dt
= α(1− q)d1
d1
N
+ αqd1(
c0 + d0 + d1
N
)−
− ET
N
d0 − fd0 (4)
Let us first explain the interaction terms. From the α at-
tacks per unit time of a defectorD1, in a fraction c1/Nthe
victim will be a C1 player. Thus, αd1c1/N describes the
rate of interactions of active defectors D1 with coopera-
tors C1. As a result of these interactions, individuals C1
lose their internal resource unit after the attack of de-
fectors and move from population c1 to c0; this explains
the first term in the equations for c0 and c1. Also, in
a fraction 1 − q of these interactions the D1 individual
keeps its resource unit, which added to the stolen unit
from the C1 player, leads to its reproduction; this gives
the first term in the equation for d1. When a D1 player
attacks C0 and D0 individuals, a fraction q of times loses
its resource unit so that it moves to population D0 (this
yields part of the second term in equations for d1 and
d0). Finally, an interaction D1D1 produces either D1D0
with probability q (which reduces the D1 population and
increases D0), or D1D1D0 with probability 1− q, which
does not affect the population of d1 but increases the one
of d0; these two processes describe the remaining inter-
action terms in the dynamic equations for d1 and d0.
On the other hand, the term in ETN c0 quantifies the
3number of individuals C0 moving to population C1 after
getting a unit of resources from the environment. In addi-
tion, individuals in population c1 that receive resources
from the environment replicate, thus increasing the c1
population. The same applies for the population of de-
fectors d0 and d1. The terms with f just describe the
number of individuals dying in each population per unit
time.
This model is much simpler than the one described in
[17], because it contains just four independent variables,
namely c0, c1, d1 and d0, in contrast to the many variables
included in the resource distributions for cooperators and
defectors of the latter model. However, it keeps most
of its ingredients and captures the main features of its
behaviour: the promotion of cooperation triggered by
resource limitations.
Model dynamics
One of the properties of the model in [17] is that a
change in the resource influx ET does not modify the
final fate of the system, but just the final population
size; more specifically, it was found in equilibrium that
N ∝ ET . This is also what the system (1)–(4) predicts
for the steady state, since the right-hand side of all the
equations are homogeneous functions of degree 1 of vari-
ables ci, di, N and ET . This means that the stationary
states are solutions of the type ci, di = λiET , with λi con-
stants depending only on α, f and q; therefore, N ∝ ET
as in the previous model.
One can obtain a further understanding of the model
through nondimensionalization. By dividing Eqs.(1)–(4)
by the death rate f and defining the dimensionless time
ft, the system turns to be described by three dimension-
less parameters, namely q, α/f and ET /f . Since we have
seen above that stationary populations are proportional
to ET , they can be generally written as
ci, di = gi(q,
α
f
)
ET
f
, (5)
with gi unknown functions of the dimensionless parame-
ters q and α/f . Then, ET /f sets the characteristic size of
the populations, and the composition, let us say the pop-
ulation fractions ci/N, di/N , comes determined by the
other two parameters, q and α/f through functions gi.
Parameter α/f has a direct interpretation: since α is the
attack rate of a defector and f−1 is the average lifetime
of an individual, α/f denotes the average number of in-
teractions performed by an active defector, and it is this
quantity, along with the cost q, what determines the fate
of the system. For simplicity, in the following we will
assume ET = 1, i.e. absolute populations ci, di will be
given in units of ET .
The most interesting feature of the model in [17] was
the existence of situations where cooperators are able to
survive in coexistence with defectors in mixed station-
ary states; otherwise the population reaches a stationary
state with only defectors. We analyze next the dynamical
behavior of Eqs. (1)–(4) through its numerical and ana-
lytical resolution. Figure 1 illustrates that the dynamic
equations (1)–(4) indeed display a similar behavior as the
original model, namely by modifying parameters α, f and
q the system ends up either in purely defective states or
in coexistence states.
One can perform a systematic analysis of the dynamic
behavior of our system (1)–(4) which will allow for a bet-
ter understanding of the model. Its analytical resolution
shows the existence of a number of stationary states: (a)
one made only of cooperators C1, which the dynamics
shows it is always unstable; (b) another one made only
of defectors, which is sometimes stable (we give it here
for completeness, d1 =
1
αq+f , d0 =
√
1+α/f−1
αq+f ); and (c) a
number of mixed states of which only one provides posi-
tive values for all population variables for some parame-
ters. The latter is the mixed state that, when takes pos-
itive values, becomes stable at the same time that the
defective state (b) becomes unstable. In order to study
this (transcritical) transition, it is useful to realise that
the populations for cooperators in the mixed state (c)
have the following form (the solutions for defectors are
always positive)
ci =
ai
α
[
α
f
− γc], (6)
where ai (i = 0, 1) and γc are functions of q only.
This expression supplies positive values for ci only when
α/f > γc. Therefore, γc(q) is the critical value over which
α/f must be in order for the system to end up into a co-
existence state. This indicates that the transition from
defective to coexistence states depends on the parameter
α/f , and not separately of parameters α and f , in agree-
ment with Eq. (5). Fig.2 shows the phase transition
from dominance of defectors to coexistence of coopera-
tors and defectors for two values of q. One observes that
the survival of cooperation is favored by larger defector
costs (larger q), as expected, since mixed states appear at
lower critical numbers of α/f . One can also display the
phase transition as a function of q for two values of α/f
(Fig. 3). One observes that as q → 1 the mixed state
tends to the stationary state made only of cooperators
C1, which is the stable state for q = 1. Finally, one can
obtain the phase diagram separating the two behaviors in
terms of the two parameters governing the system. The
separation line is found by imposing ci = 0 in Eq. (6),
i.e. α/f = γc. The analytical expression for γc is long
but it can be solved numerically (see Fig. 4).
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FIG. 1: Time evolution for the scaled number of cooperators (solid line) and number of defectors (dashed line) for two sets
of parameter values: q = 0.7 and (a) α/f = 1 and (b) α/f = 10. In (a) cooperators die out, in (b) the system ends up in a
mixed state where cooperators and defectors coexist. These two types of states are the only attractors of the dynamics. The
populations are given in units of ET /f (see Eq. (5)).
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FIG. 2: Phase transition. Fraction of cooperators (c1/N , solid line; c0/N , dotted line) as a function of parameter α/f for (a)
q = 0.5 and (b) q = 0.7. Below a critical value, cooperators die out.
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FIG. 3: Phase transition. Fraction of cooperators (c1/N , solid line; c0/N , dotted line) and defectors (dashed line) as a function
of parameter q for (a) α/f = 1 and (b) α/f = 10. Below a critical value, cooperators die out.
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FIG. 4: Phase diagram. For large costs q or large average
number of attacks in a lifetime, α/f , cooperators survive in
coexistence with defectors.
Comparison with the agent-based model
The phase diagram, Fig. 4, shows that cooperation is
favored at large defectors’ costs q, as expected, and also
at large numbers of attacks in a lifetime, α/f . The lat-
ter behavior is surprising, since at first sight interactions
should benefit defectors versus cooperators. However,
we must bear in mind that attacks are indiscriminate
and then a fraction of the attacks fall on defectors them-
selves, thus reducing the number of defectors in active
states. The dynamics of the system shows that for a
large enough number of attacks in a lifetime, the number
of active defectors decrease enough so as to allow for the
survival of cooperators. This happens in a continuous
phase transition as seen in Figs. 2 and 3. Let us note
that the latter behaviour was partially observed in the
original agent-based model. There, the attacking rate α
was set to unity by construction of the model, so that it
could not be modified. However, it was found that co-
operation increased when the death rate f decreased, in
agreement with the predictions of the present model.
Let us further compare the agent-based model in [17]
and the simplified analytical model presented here. As
previously noticed, they show a similar qualitative be-
havior, both displaying a phase transition from purely
defective states at low costs and small death rates to sta-
ble coexistence states in the opposite limit. However,
there exist a few differences between them. The nu-
merical simulations of the former model predicted dom-
inance of cooperators for large costs (see Fig. 2 in ref.
[17]), whereas this does not occur in the analytical model.
We have checked this difference of behavior by perform-
ing large-size simulations of the agent-based model, thus
minimizing finite size effects; they confirm the extinction
of defectors for large costs, and the existence of a region
where they extinguish due to stochastic fluctuations in
coexistence states with few defectors.
LIMITING RESOURCE CONSTRAINING
REPRODUCTION AND SURVIVAL
In this section we provide an analytical model for the
study of a well-mixed population of unconditional coop-
erators and defectors which exchange resources among
them and with the environment but, in contrast to the
previous section, here the resource limits not only the
reproduction of individuals but also their survival. A
more complex, agent-based model, analyzing this situ-
ation was presented in [18]. Again, the model consists
of an evolving well-mixed population of self-replicating
individuals that receive resources from the environment
and exchange resources during interactions. Everything
works as in the previous model except in two issues: (i)
now individuals do not die at random, but when indi-
viduals exhaust their resources, and (ii) each individual
dissipates an amount of resources El per unit time in
order to keep alive.
Analytical model
The simplified model follows the same spirit of the pre-
vious section. The internal resources of individuals are
either 0 or 1. Each defector attacks at a rate α individu-
als chosen at random and steals its internal resources. To
do so, the defector must have internal resources greater
than 0 (i.e. Ei = 1). In every interaction, the defector
loses its unit of resources with probability q, which is thus
the average cost paid by a defector in an interaction. The
system receives resources from the environment at a rate
ET , and they are distributed equally among the N indi-
viduals of the population independently of its strategy.
In addition, individuals dissipate resources in living ac-
tivities at a rate r; this is implemented as the probability
of spending one resource unit per unit time. If an individ-
ual with 0 internal resources is attacked or it is required
to dissipate resources it dies. On the other side, when
an individual with internal resources Ei = 1 receives an
extra unit of resources it splits into two identical copies,
each one with Ei = 1. Again, resource allocation, repro-
duction and death rules are equal for both cooperators
and defectors, being the strategy the only difference.
Let us note that the main differences of the model pre-
sented here and the latter model are again: (a) now there
are only two resource levels Ei = 0, 1, instead of a much
larger distribution, (b) the cost paid by active defectors
in an interaction, and resource dissipation are stochastic.
We use the notation of the previous section for the
number of cooperators ci and defectors di. The model
6equations are very similar to them:
dc0
dt
= −αd1
c0
N
+ αd1
c1
N
− ET
N
c0 − rc0 + rc1 (7)
dc1
dt
= −αd1
c1
N
+
ET
N
(c0 + c1)− rc1 (8)
dd1
dt
= α(1− q)d1
c1
N
− αqd1(
c0 + d0 + d1
N
) +
+
ET
N
(d0 + d1)− rd1 (9)
dd0
dt
= −αd1
d0
N
+ α(1 − q)d1
d1
N
+ αqd1(
c0 + d0 + d1
N
)−
− ET
N
d0 − rd0 + rd1 (10)
The interaction terms are as in Eqs. (1)–(4), with the
exception of the first term in the equations for c0 and
d0, describing deaths due to interactions. In addition,
dissipation kills individuals c0 and d0 at a rate r and
moves individuals from c1 to c0, and from d1 to d0 also
at a rate r.
Model dynamics
One can analyze the dynamical behavior of our model
equations (7)–(10) following a scheme analogous to the
one performed in the previous section. Since the right-
hand side of the system equations are homogeneous func-
tions of ci, di and ET , the stationary populations ci, di
are proportional to ET . Therefore, ET just determines
the population size, but not the composition. This is in
agreement with the behavior found in the agent-based
model [18]. One can also nondimensionalize the system
equations by defining a nondimensional time rt. This
shows that the system is ruled by three nondimensional
parameters: q, α/r and ET /r and, analogously to the
previos section, the stationary populations obey the scal-
ing relation
ci, di = gi(q,
α
r
)
ET
r
. (11)
Again, ET /r provides the characteristic size of popula-
tions ci, di; this is larger the bigger the resource influx
rate ET and the smaller its dissipation rate r. On the
other hand, the composition of the final population is
determined by parameters q and α/r.
The numerical resolution of the system (7)–(10) dis-
plays two main behaviors depending on the parameter
values: dominance of defection and dominance of coop-
eration (see Fig. 5), in agreement with the behavior of
the agent-based model [18], and in contrast to the case
where the limiting resources just affect reproduction and
not survival discussed in the previous section. Fig. 5b
shows that coexistence of cooperators and defectors is
also possible, in oposition to the behavior of the more
complex agent-based model. Again, Fig. 5 shows that
the final composition of the system changes as a parame-
ter is varied, indicating a phase transition from a popula-
tion of only defectors at small costs q and a population of
only cooperators at larger q values, separated by a coex-
istence region (see Fig. 6). Let’s analyze the parameter
region where each attractor becomes the stable one, i.e.
let us find the phase diagram of the model.
The analytical resolution of the system reveals the ex-
istence of three stationary states: (a) one made of co-
operators (c1 = ET /r, c0 = 0.62ET /r), (b) one made of
defectors (d1 = ET /(αq+r), d0 = ET [
√
α2 + 5r2 + 6αr−
r−α]/2r(αq + r)), and (c) a mixed state whose solution
provides positive solutions only for a limited set of param-
eter values. The whole solution is rather cumbersome,
but one can extract valuable information by focussing in
some aspects of it. The solution for c1 is (ET = 1)
c1 =
2.62αq2 − 1.62qα+ 3.62qr− 2.62r
qα(1 − q) , (12)
which is positive provided that
α
r
=
1− 1.38q
q(q − 0.62) > 0. (13)
This shows that the mixed state can only exist in a thin
range of q values between 0.62 and 0.72, in agreement
with Fig. 5b. The same happens for solution c0. Popula-
tions d0 and d1 become negative at q > 0.72. Expression
(13) provides the separation line between dominance of
defectors and coexistence; for q > 0.72 cooperators dom-
inate (see Fig. 6). Therefore, the dynamics is mainly
ruled by the defector cost q, being defectors dominant
below q = 0.62 and cooperators dominant above q = 0.72
(Fig.7). Aside from the thin range of coexistence in the
parameter region separating both dominating behaviors,
the analytical model thus provides the same qualitative
behavior as the agent-based model presented in [18].
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the dynamics of two
analytical models describing the evolution of well-mixed
populations of unconditional cooperators and defectors
under limiting resources. These models try to capture
the essence of two separate agent-based models dealing
with two different situations. In one of them, the limiting
resource restricts the ability of individuals to reproduce
but do not alter their survival conditions. In the other,
the resource rules both the survival and reproduction of
individuals. The main differences of the models intro-
duced here and the agent-based models are, on the one
hand, that the distribution of internal resources is lim-
ited to two states, instead of a continuous distribution
and, on the other, that the cost paid by defectors is now
a stochastic process.
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FIG. 5: Time evolution for the scaled number of cooperators (solid line) and number of defectors (dashed line) for three sets of
parameter values: α/r = 1 and (a) q = 0.6, (b) q = 0.7 and (c) q = 0.8. In (a) cooperators die out, in (b) the system ends up
in a mixed state where cooperators and defectors coexist, in (c) cooperators get rid of defectors. Two phase transitions occur
as q increases. The populations are given in units of ET /r (see Eq. (11)).
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FIG. 6: Phase transitions for α/r = 10. Population of de-
fectors (dashed line) and cooperators (solid line) as function
of defectors cost q. As q grows two phase transitions occur:
first, a transition from defective to coexistence states, and a
second one at q = 0.723 from coexistence to purely cooperator
states.
Analytical models have the advantage with respect to
simulation models of allowing for a complete and more
compact analysis of their behaviour. Indeed, we have
expanded the study of the agent-based models by sepa-
rating the time scales of all the mechanisms in the model.
In effect, in the agent-based models, we assumed equal
rates for defectors’ attacks and the feeding process. Here,
in contrast, we consider different rates for each process.
This increases in one the number of parameters. How-
ever, the nondimensionalization of the models has per-
mitted us to identify the dimensionless parameters ruling
the model dynamics, a study which is not easy to perform
in agent-based models. As a result, we have easily seen
that the resource influx from the environment determines
the size of the final population, but not the composition
of the population, a result that was observed in the simu-
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FIG. 7: Phase diagram. Below q = 0.62 defectors dominate.
Above q = 0.72 cooperators dominate. In between there is a
thin region of coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
lations of the agent based models. The final composition
is ruled by two parameters: the average cost paid by
defectors and the number of attacks in a characteristic
time.
The behaviour of the analytical models ressemble very
much the ones obtained in the corresponding more com-
plex agent-based models, remarkably allowing for the sur-
vival of cooperators in some regions of the parameter
space. When resources limit only reproduction, coopera-
tors are able to coexist with defectors at larger defectors
cost and larger number of interactions in a lifetime. The
latter behavior may seem surprising, as one would expect
defectors attacks indefectively to benefit defectors and
harm cooperators. However, since attacks are indiscrim-
inate, a large number of interactions in a lifetime reduces
the number of defectors in active states and eventually
allows for the survival of cooperators. Remarkably, this
process occurs following a phase transition, so that coop-
erators are able to survive only when parameters surpass
8some critical value. When resources restrict reproduc-
tion and survival the fate of the system is essentially a
population of defectors at small defector costs, and a pop-
ulation of cooperators at large costs, separated by a thin
region of coexistence at intermediate costs. Aside from
the coexistence region, this is the behavior found in the
agent-based model. The origin of this difference is prob-
ably due to the different resource distribution in both
models (discrete in the analytical model, and continuous
in the agent based model).
Finally, the work presented here could be extended by
modifying the way resources are delivered and foraged
by agents. If the mobility of agents is limited, these may
have only the possibility to explore nearby resources and
thus not all the resources provided by the environment
would be used. Therefore it would be interesting to study
the implications of the limitation of resources including
space, and analysing inhomogeneous distributions of re-
sources. This situation will probably enhance the sur-
vival of cooperators, but it may also lead to unexpected
results.
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